Abstract The Tagalog Ability / Involuntary Action (AIA) verbal form conveys apparently unrelated modal meanings: that an action was within what an agent could do or that it was beyond what an agent could control, for instance. Recent analyses for the Malagasy and St'át'imcets counterparts of this form propose that this morphology contributes circumstantial modality and conveys, roughly, that the event that it describes follows from a set of facts (Davis, Matthewson & Rullmann 2009; Paul, Ralalaoherivony & de Swart 2016) . In Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming we discuss some challenges for extending this type of analysis to Tagalog. Here, we present an alternative proposal. We follow previous analyses in assuming that the AIA form projects its domain of possibilities from a set of facts, but depart from these analyses in proposing (i) that the modal component of the Tagalog AIA form is non-at-issue and (ii) that it conveys, via a presupposition, that, given the facts that the described event is assumed to causally depend on, this event was not expected.
Introduction
There are two classes of verbal forms in Tagalog: the neutral and the so-called 'ability/involuntary action' (AIA) form (Schachter & Otanes 1972; Dell 1983 ). These forms contrast in their interpretation, as the pair of sentences in (1) shows. The sentence in (1a), with its verb in the perfective aspect neutral form, conveys that Lisa opened the door. The sentence in (1b), with its verb in the perfective aspect AIA form, does too. On top of that, (1b) makes an extra modal claim: that opening the door was within what Lisa could do or that it was beyond what she could control, depending on the context. 1 At first sight, the AIA form seems to lump together what look like unrelated modal meanings. Why? Do the attested interpretations derive from one and the same core meaning? What kind of modality does the AIA form express?
These questions are not new. They have been recently addressed and answered in connection with similar verbal forms in other languages. 2 The Tagalog AIA form finds counterparts in the Malagasy verbal prefix maha- (Paul et al. 2016) , and, outside Austronesian, in the 'Out-of-Control' circumfix ka-...-a in St'át'imcets (Davis et al. 2009 ), among others. Like the Tagalog AIA form, the Malagasy and St'át'imcets forms can convey ability attributions or describe accidental actions, as shown in (2) (Paul et al. 2016) Non-Tagalog examples follow the glosses used in the source texts. 2 To our knowledge, there is no standard term used to refer to the Tagalog AIA forms and also to their counterparts in other languages. Here, we will use 'AIA' to refer to Tagalog forms and, occasionally, to its counterpart on other languages. 3 The parallel is not perfect, though. Unlike the Tagalog AIA forms, Paul et al. (2016) observe that when maha-combines with stative predicates, it receives a causative interpretation that the Tagalog AIA does not seem to have. Davis et al. (2009) also report a number of other interpretations of ka-...-a. We discuss some of the differences in Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming. Paul et al. (2016) (for St'át'imcets and Malagasy, respectively) have put forth semantic analyses of AIA forms that answer the questions above. These analyses assume that the interpretation of AIA forms in Malagasy and St'át'imcets derive from one and the same modal core. Although there are significant differences in their implementation, these analyses propose, for the languages that they study, that AIA forms contribute circumstantial modality; in particular, that they convey that a certain outcome follows from a set of facts. 4 In Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming we assess the extent to which this type of approach can be extended to Tagalog by focusing on the interpretation of the Tagalog AIA forms in the perfective aspect. We conclude there that there are differences in the interpretation of AIA forms in Tagalog, Malagasy, and St'át'imcets, and that this line of reasoning faces some challenges when extended to Tagalog. For reasons of space, we will not reproduce here the main conclusions that we arrive at in that paper, to which the interested reader is referred. Instead, we will present here an alternative analysis of the Tagalog AIA form, one that partially follows previous proposals about other AIA forms, but departs from them in several respects.
In Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming, we find no reason to challenge the hypothesis that the type of modality that AIA forms contribute is sensitive to a set of relevant circumstances or facts. Accordingly, our proposal in this paper follows previous analyses in assuming that the Tagalog AIA form projects its domain of possibilities from a set of facts. We depart from previous analyses, however, in proposing (i) that the modal component of this form is non-at-issue, and (ii) that it conveys, via presupposition, that, given the facts that the described event is assumed to causally depend on, this event was not expected-rather than conveying that the described event follows (or is expected to follow) from the relevant circumstances.
The paper is organized as follows. To make the paper self-contained, Section 2 repeats some background about the form of the Tagalog AIA morphology presented in Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming, and introduces two properties of the interpretation of the perfective form that guided our discussion in that paper. Section 3 presents our proposal: its basic components are introduced in Subsections 3.1 Neutral AIA AGENT b<um>ukas naka-bukas PATIENT b<in>ukas* na-bukas* LOCATIVE b<in>kus-an na-buks-an CONVEYANCE i-b<in>ukas na-i-bukas We start with some basic background about verbal forms in Tagalog. As discussed in the introduction, Tagalog verbs can appear either in the neutral or in the AIA form. Each of these forms inflect for voice and aspect: Table 1 shows the neutral and AIA forms in the perfective aspect in different voices, and Table 2 the neutral and AIA versions of the locative voice in different aspects.
Voice marking correlates with the argument marked as the so-called 'pivot', which bears nominative ang/si. This is shown, for AIA forms, in (4). (4) a. Naka-bili Imperfective form, present/habitual interpretation
We will focus here on the interpretation of AIA forms in the perfective aspect by introducing two properties that set these forms apart from their neutral counterparts. The first property is that AIA morphology restricts the possible contexts in which the sentence that it occurs in can be felicitously uttered. To illustrate this, we will make use of the following three scenarios: In all three scenarios in (6), Lisa opened the door. The perfective AIA sentence in (1b), repeated below in (7a), conveys that Lisa opened the door, just like its counterpart in the neutral form in (1a), repeated below in (7b), does. Yet, the AIA sentence in (7a) cannot be felicitously used to describe all three scenarios. It can be felicitously used to describe Scenario 2, and, in that case, it is naturally paraphrased with the English sentences Lisa managed to open the door or Lisa was able to open the door. It can also be used to describe Scenario 3, where it is naturally paraphrased with the English sentence Lisa accidentally opened the door. But (7a) cannot be felicitously used to describe Scenario 1-to the extent that Lisa's opening of the door is taken to be completely predictable and expected, as intended. In contrast, the neutral form sentence in (7b) can be felicitously used in all three scenarios-although speakers can express a preference for (7a) in Scenarios 2 and 3. Moving beyond this contextual restriction, Dell (1983) notes a second property that characterizes AIA forms in the perfective in contrast with their neutral counterparts: that they entail the actual culmination of the event described. The pair of discourses in (8) illustrates this point. The discourse in (8a) feels contradictory. The first sentence, with a verb in the AIA form, implies that the rock was pushed, and therefore, that it moved. This implication contradicts the continuation, which explicitly conveys that the rock did not move. Changing the verb in the first sentence from the AIA form to the neutral form, as in (8b), turns the contradictory discourse into a consistent one. this.GEN 'Ben managed to push the rock, but it didn't move because it was so heavy. ' (after Dell 1983) In Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming we noted that the actuality entailment of positive AIA sentences in the perfective is reversed under negation. While positive AIA sentences convey the existence of a completed actual event of the type described by the VP, their negative counterparts convey that there is no actual event of the type described by the VP-rather than the weaker claim that there is no completed actual event of the type described by the VP. To illustrate: while the positive version of (9) conveys that Fe drew the red ball, the negative version conveys that she didn't. To sum up, AIA forms in the perfective convey (i) a modal meaning component that restricts the types of scenarios where they can be used felicitously, and (ii) an actuality entailment that is reversed under negation. With respect to (i), we noted that AIA forms can appropriately describe scenarios where a certain event obtained despite what was likely to be the case, given the relevant circumstances, and that they are incompatible with the description of completely expected outcomes. 7 In the next section, we will present an analysis that aims to derive these two properties. The basic idea is as follows. The actuality implications of AIA forms are reminiscent of the behavior of implicative verbs (Karttunen 1971; Baglini & Francez 2016) and invite exploring the possibility that the modal component of AIA morphology is not at issue. This is what we will assume. We will take the modal component to be contributed by a presupposition. Like in previous analyses, AIA projects the possibilities that it ranges over from a set of facts. Unlike in previous analyses, however, we will not assume that the AIA form requires the described event to follow from those facts. Instead, we will propose that the AIA form presupposes that, given the facts that the described event is assumed to causally depend on, this event was not expected. This modal presupposition rules out inevitable processes (which are completely expected, given the relevent circumstances) and is satisfied in the scenarios where the meaning contribution of the AIA form is paraphrased with the implicative verb manage to or the adverb accidentally. According to our analysis, when its modal presupposition is satisfied, an unembedded sentence with the verb in the perfective AIA form simply asserts that an event of the type expressed by the VP took place. Embedding the sentence under negation is then predicted to convey that this is not the case.
Proposal

Components
We will start by characterizing the modal component of AIA forms, which, as we mentioned before, will be taken to be non-at-issue. To capture the modal component of AIA forms, we will make use of two parameters of interpretation. We assume that the modal contribution of AIA forms is sensitive to a set of facts (true propositions) in the world of evaluation w and to a stereotypical ordering source that captures what is expected in w.
We do not depart too much from previous proposals in this respect: we follow both Paul et al. 2016 and Davis et al. 2009 in relativizing the interpretation of AIA morphology to a set of facts in the world of evaluation, and Davis et al. 2009 in resorting to a stereotypical ordering source.
We depart slightly from previous proposals, however, in making an extra assumption about the facts that the interpretation of AIA is sensitive to: we will assume that the facts that the interpretation of AIA forms requires considering are certain properties of the world of evaluation that are causally relevant for whether not the event that the AIA sentence describes happens. But we will not have much to say about how these facts are determined; we will simply take causal dependencies to be primitive and determined by a parameter of interpretation, a causal structure C .
A causal structure C for a set of worlds W represents causal relations between variables, usually thought of as events or states (Thomason 2014; Schulz 2011; Baglini & Francez 2016) . In the Causal Premise Semantics presented in Kaufmann 2013, which we will follow here on this point, variables are modelled as partitions of W (which we can intuitively think of as yes/no questions or issues). 8 Given a non-empty set of possible worlds W , a casual structure for W is a pair C = U, < , where U is a set of finite partitions on W and < is a directed acyclic graph over U (Kaufmann 2013 (Kaufmann : p.1151 )-a directed acyclic graph is a binary relation ('variable 1 directly depends causally on variable 2 ') whose transitive closure ('variable 1 depends causally on variable 2 ') is a strict (irreflexive) partial order. The graph in (10) provides an illustration. The nodes in (10) represent variables and the arrows represent causal dependencies-we get an arrow from one variable to another when the latter directly depends causally on the former. Intuitively, what the causal structure in (10) conveys is that whether or not the door opens depends on whether or not the button is pressed and on whether or not the right code is entered. o: 'that the door opens'
We will keep in mind that causal structures represent causal dependencies at a certain granularity level. Variables can be represented as being independent even when at a more fine grained level they might depend on other variables, and intermediate variables that are present at a certain fine grained level might be ignored in less fine grained representations (Baglini & Francez 2016) .
Given a causal structure C and a world w, we can collect in a set all propositions in any of the variables in C that are true in w. This will be the set of causally relevant facts in world w, which we will indicate in the graphs using boldface, as in (11), where we represent the causally relevant facts in two worlds w 0 and w 1 . We will take the interpretation of AIA forms to be sensitive to a subset of these facts.
(11) {b, ¬b} {c, ¬c} {o, ¬o} {b, ¬b} {c, ¬c} {o, ¬o}
Causally relevant facts (given C ) Causally relevant facts (given C ) in w 0 = {b, c, o}
We will assume that the interpretation of the perfective AIA forms conveys that the existence of an event of the type described by the VP is expected in the world of evaluation, given what the existence of this type of event is taken to causally depend on. In order to express this, we need to make reference to what is expected in the world of evaluation. We will then assume that the interpretation of the AIA form involves a stereotypical ordering source S, which maps any world w to a set of propositions that represent what is normal or most expected in w (Kratzer 1981 (Kratzer , 1991 ). As we have mentioned before, because the unexpected happens, propositions in the ordering source can be false in the world of evaluation. Suppose, for instance, that S yields for both w 0 and w 1 the singleton in (12). What is expected in w 0 is true in this possible world. What is expected in w 1 , in contrast, turns out to be false.
(12) S(w 0 ) = S(w 1 ) = {λ w. o w ↔ (b w ∧ c w )}
The modal component
Given a proposition p, a causal structure C , and a stereotypical ordering source S, we can check whether in a world w, p is (in)consistent with the facts in w that are causally relevant for whether p or ¬p is the case (as determined by the causal dependencies in C ) and with what is expected in w (as determined by S(w)).
The recipe will be familiar. We take the set of causally relevant facts in w for whether p or ¬p is the case, given C . This set will be the subset of the causally relevant facts that contains any true proposition in any node dominating the variable {p, ¬p} in C . We then add to this set all propositions from the stereotypical ordering source S(w), together with p. We then check whether the resulting set is consistent. 9 If the resulting set is consistent, p is consistent with the expectations in w, given the set of causally relevant facts for whether p or ¬p is the case-(at least) some of the most expected worlds that share the causally relevant facts with w are p-worlds. If the resulting set is inconsistent, none of the most expected worlds sharing with w the causally relevant facts for whether p or ¬p is the case are p-worlds. 10 We contend that the AIA form in the perfective presupposes that the occurrence of an event of the type described by the VP in the world of evaluation w is not consistent with what is expected in w and with the facts in w that the occurrence of an event of that type is taken to causally depend on. We capture this as in (13), where C →p,w names the set of causally relevant facts in w dominating {p, ¬p} in C , and p VP names the proposition that maps any world w to true if there is at least an event e of the type described by the VP in w (λ w.∃e VP c (e)(w)).
(13) a. For any e, w, AIA VP c (e)(w) is defined iff i. c makes available a causal structure C and a stereotypical ordering source S and, ii.C →p VP ,w ∪ S w ∪ {p VP } is an inconsistent set of propositions.
b. If defined, AIA VP c (e)(w) = 1 iff VP c (e)(w) = 1 9 A set of propositions is consistent if there is at least one world where all propositions in the set are true. 10 We are assuming that stereotypical ordering sources are consistent.
In (13), we assume that VPs express relations between events and worlds. We take perfective aspect to map a relation R i,st -we will use type i for events-to the proposition that is true in a world w iff R holds of at least a past event and w, as in (14). 11 (14) PFV c (R i,st )(w) = 1 iff ∃e[e < now c & R(e)(w) = 1]
We illustrate next the predictions of this setup in some representative scenarios.
Illustrations
Consider again Scenario 1 in (6a), repeated in (15) We noted in Section 2 that the sentence in (7a), repeated in (16) below, is deviant in this scenario-to the extent that the opening of the door is taken to be completely predictable and expected, as intended. Under plausible assumptions about the causal dependencies, facts, and expectations that Scenario 1 makes available, the current setup captures the deviance of (16) as a presupposition failure.
Consider, for instance, the causal structure in (17) . Intuitively, what (17) conveys is that whether or not the door opens depends on whether or not the right code is entered and on whether or not the open button is pressed. Similarly, whether or not the right code is entered depends on whether or not the agent remembers the code and on whether or not she has the intention to enter the code. The propositional letters in boldface type convey the causally relevant facts: according to the scenario, Lisa remembers the code, has the intention to enter it, enters the right code, presses the open button, and the door opens. o: 'that the door opens'
The relevant set of propositions is now (21), which differs from (18), only in that it contains the proposition that Lisa does not remember the code, rather than the proposition that she remembers the code. This difference has an important consequence: the relevant set of propositions is now inconsistent. This means that the presupposition triggered by AIA morphology will now be satisfied: the sentence in (16) is no longer a presupposition failure and makes a true claim-that Lisa opened the door.
The context in (20) is one where the agent has the intention to bring about a certain state of affairs and this state of affairs obtains in the absence of one of the facts that is expected to obtain (remembering the code). In this context, (16) can be naturally paraphrased with the help of the English implicative verb manage to. The predicted modal presupposition is also satisfied in contexts where the relevant state of affairs obtains despite the agent's intention, and where 16 is naturally paraphrased with the adverb accidentally. Consider, for instance, Scenario 3 in (6c), repeated below: The context in (22) is one where, again, (16) can be felicitously used to make a true claim. This is expected under current assumptions. The reasoning that we applied to capture what happens with Scenario 2 applies here in a completely parallel way. Suppose that we evaluate (16) with respect to the same causal structure and expectations. The causally relevant facts now include the fact that Lisa remembers the code and the fact that she does not have the intention to enter the right code. o: 'that the door opens'
The set of relevant propositions, in (24), is, again, inconsistent. The AIA presupposition is then satisfied in this scenario, and the claim that (16) makes-that Lisa opened the door-is true.
To sum up: the modal presupposition that AIA contributes is tailored to rule out scenarios where the occurrence of an event of the type described by the VP is consistent with the relevant facts and expectations, like Scenario 1, but to allow for scenarios like Scenarios 2 and 3, where the facts that the occurrence of the described event are taken to depend on are inconsistent with the expectations.
We conclude the presentation of the analysis with a few words about the nature of the modal presupposition that our analysis assumes and its projection behavior.
A modal presupposition?
Under the current analysis, the modal presupposition that AIA forms contribute imposes a weak contextual requirement. This is probably best seen through an example: We have captured the deviance of our target sentence in (16), repeated in (25) below, by making the assumption that the relevant causal structure looks like the one in (17). But recall that causal structures commit us to a certain fine-grainedness in the description of causal dependencies, and it is not difficult to add to (17) an extra intermediate causal dependency whose expected value could fail. Suppose, for instance, that we take (26) to be the relevant causal structure, where the opening of the door is taken to depend on whether the right code is entered, the open button is pressed, and, say, the electrical current of the internal mechanism is constant. Suppose that we take the expectations in the world of evaluation to be as in (26), too. Assuming that the electrical current was not constant would make the relevant set of propositions, in (27), inconsistent, and (26) to not be a presupposition failure. e: 'that the electrical current in the internal circuit is constant'
Is the predicted contextual requirement too weak? We tend to think that this is not the case. There are reasons to believe that the weakness of the contextual requirement is a virtue, rather than a defect, of the analysis. The meaning contribution of AIA forms is hard to pin down. It shines through in cases where speakers take the described event to be completely automatic and predictable. Most of the time, however, it is not completely impossible to rescue an AIA sentence by assuming that an expected fact did not obtain, as represented in the last graph. The degree of deviance of AIA sentences seems to correlate with the degree to which the described event is taken to be completely predictable. The harder it is to construe the described event as unpredictable, given what it is taken to causally depend on, the more deviant AIA sentences seem to be perceived. And this seems to align well with the proposed analysis.
We note, however, that the weakness of the contextual requirement that we assume AIA forms convey makes it difficult to detect. This, in turn, makes its projection behavior difficult to evaluate. We will wrap up with a few remarks about this topic by considering what happens with the modal component when we embed a perfective AIA form under negation or a question operator.
The behavior of the predicted modal component in negative sentences is consistent with its expected projection behavior. Consider, for instance, the sentence in (28). If the modal component contributed by the AIA form is indeed a presupposition, it is expected to project past negation: (28) should then require that it be taken for granted that the opening of the door was not compatible with the relevant facts and expectations, and, when this is true, to assert that Lisa did not open the door. The sentence in (28) can be used to make a felicitous true claim in this scenario. This is consistent with our expectations. Suppose that we assume, as before, the causal structure and expectations in (30). Under this assumption, the relevant set of propositions, in (31), is inconsistent: the predicted presupposition is then satisfied, and the asserted content (that Lisa did not open the door) is true. Under the familiar causal structure and expectations, the relevant set of propositions, in (33), is consistent, so the predicted presupposition is not satisfied. The sentence is predicted to be a presupposition failure in this context. Is the prediction borne out? What we see does not differ substantially from what we see with the positive counterpart of (28) in Scenario 1. Whether or not (28) is taken to be deviant seems to correlate with the extent to which the opening of the door is taken to be expected: for (28) to be felicitous, it has to be assumed that some causally required fact did not obtain. Notice that the deviance of the question is expected even if we assumed that the predicted presupposition is accommodated. Under that view, (35) would be asking whether or not Lisa opened the door. But the speaker already knows that she did, so asking the question in this context is predicted to be deviant. If the unexpected component were at-issue content, (35) would roughly convey what the question in (36) does. Since (36) would be an appropriate question to ask, the deviance of (35) would not be expected. To sum up: in line with previous approaches to AIA forms in other languages (Davis et al. 2009; Paul et al. 2016) , the attested interpretations of the Tagalog AIA form derive from a single modal core, which is anchored to a set of facts. Focusing on its perfective variants, we have proposed, departing from previous approaches to other AIA forms, that the Tagalog AIA form contributes a non at issue modal meaning component, which conveys that what is expected in w for the occurrence of an event of the type described by the VP does not obtain in w.
The predicted semantic contribution of the AIA form is context sensitive: it hinges on what the occurrence of an event of the type described by the VP is assumed to depend on (at a given granularity level for causal dependencies) and on what the expectations are. This-we have hypothesized-might explain why it is hard to pinpoint the exact semantic contribution of this form.
To conclude, we highlight a limitation: The analysis presented in this paper focuses on the perfective version of the AIA form, and it remains to be seen how the predicted interpretation of this morphology interacts with the semantic contribution of imperfective and prospective aspect.
AIA forms in the prospective aspect seem to convey future culmination and a meaning component that can be paraphrased with English manage to, as (37a) shows. The imperfective form is often used to express an ability attribution. In cases like (37b), where the imperfective contributes a habitual interpretation, the AIA form does not require the existence of an actual completed event of the type described by the VP, but the AIA form can also be paraphrased with manage to.
Determining whether the proposed analysis predicts the behavior of AIA forms in the prospective and imperfective requires investigating the semantic contribution of the Tagalog aspectual inflection, an important task that we need to leave for further research. 
